Environment, health and labor market
Xavier Pautrel∗
University of Angers (granem)-tepp, France
June 29, 2017

Abstract
We re-examine the impact of environmental taxation on health and
output, in the presence of labor market frictions. Our main findings
are that matching process and wage bargaining introduce new channels of transmission of environmental taxation on the economy such
that assuming perfect labor market leads to over-estimate the positive
impact of environmental taxation on health. We also demonstrate that
rising abatement expenditures as a way of tightening the environmental policy would be better for health than increasing environmental
tax in the presence of market labor imperfections.
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Introduction

Since more than fifty years, a huge amount of epidemiological literature
demonstrated how pollution and global warming are harmful to health. More
recently, several theoretical contributions in the field of economics, highlighted different mechanisms through which environmental regulation could
improve health. Nevertheless, none of these economic contributions took into
account the role that labor market could play, while there is a growing empirical evidence according to which unemployment and firm’s layoffs deteriorate
physical and mental health.
The aim of this article is to re-examine the health effects of the environmental policy (hereafter EP) in the presence of labor market imperfections. Because environmental preservation could reduce economic activity
and therefore increase unemployment, would the health dividend expected
from a better environment be reduced by the rise on unemployment or even
be reversed?
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It is well-established now that pollution and global warming have a detrimental impact on health, through both morbidity and mortality. Economic
literature dealt with this empirical evidence to demonstrate that environmental policy, limiting pollution, could generate a double dividend by improving
health (for the most recent contributions see Bretschger and Vinogradova,
2017; Palivos and Varvarigos, 2017; Klarl, 2016; Chen et al., 2015; Wang
et al., 2015).
Despite progress in our understanding of the economic mechanisms through
which improvements in health could limit the negative impact of environmental policy on the economy, to our best knowledge, not any contribution deals
with the role market labor, especially market labor imbalances, could play on
the positive influence of the environmental policy on health.1 Indeed, aforementioned theoretical articles identified channels of transmission that could
be affected by labor market imperfections and as a result the positive impact
of environmental policy on health could be altered or even reversed. Furthermore, at the individual level the negative impact of job loss on individuals’
health is becoming well-documented and therefore the expected positive effect of environmental policy on health could be overestimated.2 Sullivan and
von Wachter (2009) find short- and long-term effect of job displacement on
mortality hazard using quarterly Pensylvania data covering 1980-2006, focusing on high-seniority male workers. Eliason and Storrie (2009a) study the
impact of workers displacement due to firm closures in Sweden in 1987 and
1988. They show that the mortality risk for men rises by 44 percent in the
four years after job loss. With the same data, Eliason and Storrie (2009b)
find evidence that, during the 12-years following job loss, there exists a significant increase in the risk of hospitalization due to alcohol-related conditions,
1

Note that some articles about environmental policy dealt with labor market, like
the “double dividend” literature. However, few other articles account for labor market
imperfections (for example Ono, 2008; Sanz and Schwartz, 2013; Hafstead and Williams III,
2016, amongst others).
2
There is also a literature finding that at the aggregate level, mortality rate is procyclical and therefore recession is good for health because people change their health
behaviour (for example Ruhm, 2000, 2003, 2015, 2016; Ruhm and Jones, 2012; Dehejia
and Lleras-Muney, 2004). As noted by (Miller et al., 2009, p.122), “a typical estimate from
the literature suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in a state’s unemployment rate
is associated with a 0.54 percent reduction in that state’s mortality rates.” . Nevertheless,
Miller et al. (2009) provide evidence that the improvements in health found during recessions do not come from changes in the employment-status of individuals but rather from
external factors. Stevens et al. (2015) confirm this result finding that “own-group employment rates are not systematically related to own-group mortality”. Coile et al. (2014) show
that for workers in their late 50s or 60s recession could make them temporarily healthier
but finally is negative in longer term. Bender et al. (2013) for 11 European countries for
period 1971-2001, show that unemployment temporary reduces mortality but increases it
in long term. Using data from the Great Recession, Currie et al. (2015) show that recession
may have a detrimental impact on mothers self-reported health with an increase in their
smoking and drug use. They also find that this impact vary according to whether mothers are hispanic, white, well-educated, less-educated,... For more details on the existing
literature, see Suhrcke and Stuckler (2012); Currie et al. (2015); Modrek et al. (2017).
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for men and women, and due to traffic accidents and self-harm for men only.
Using administrative data from Denmark in the period 1980-2006, Browning
and Heinesen (2012) find that the risk of overall mortality rises of 79% in
the year of displacement and remains 11% higher in the 20 years following
the replacement, showing that the detrimental impact of job loss on health
continues in the long-run. They report an increase in the risk of overall
mortality and death from circulatory disease, as well suicide and suicide attempts, death and hospitalization related to traffic accidents, alcohol-related
disease and mental illness.3 Charles and DeCicca (2008) use data from the
National Health Interview Surveys (NHISs) and estimate the impact of local
labor market conditions on the measures of health and health behaviors of a
sample of individuals living in the largest metropolitan statistical areas in the
United States. They report evidence that weight-related health (captured by
the body mass index) and mental health deteriorate with the market labor
conditions, and that the relationships are stronger for people less educated
and for African-american people. All the empirical evidence reported here4
are explained by the fact that job loss would increase stress and fear of losing
job, and/or would have income and wealth effects. They highlight the potential significant impact that market labor imbalances could play in relation
between environmental policy and health.
The present article aims at improving the current theoretical literature on
the positive effect of environmental policy on health, by developing a more
realistic framework in which market labor shares common features of contemporaneous market labor: unemployment and wage bargaining. For that
purpose, we develop an intertemporal general equilibrium model with pollution, endogenous health-status and imperfections on labor market. Pollution
is assumed to originate from either final output or physical capital and environmental policy is defined as a tax on the source of pollution.5 Individual
health-status is modeled as in Grossman (1972): it is viewed as a capital
in which the agent invests time and medical expenditures, and whose stock
depreciates with time. Following Cropper (1981), we assume that pollution
increases the depreciation rate. Finally, labor market imperfections are captured through a matching process and a wage bargaining à la Nash, using the
framework by Shi and Wen (1997, 1999). More importantly, while we discussed the empirical evidence about the detrimental impact of unemployment
in health, we do not assume here that health-status is directly affected by
the level of unemployment in the economy or by the employed/unemployed3

Dee (2001), using the annual telephone-based survey responses to the Center for Disease Control ’s Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance for period 1984-1995, also showed that
binge drinking rises during downturns, not only for those who lost their jobs but also for
those who remained employed. He noted that these results may reflect the influence of
economic stress.
4
For further references, see Kasl and Jones (2000).
5
We also investigate the role played by abatement expenditures to mitigate pollution.
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status of the agent. Rather making such an ad-hoc assumption, we let the
channel of transmission between unemployment and health operate through
time-allocation trade-offs and income effects (as reported by literature).
The contribution of the article is manyfold:
1. A tighter environmental tax (on final output or physical capital) affects
labor market equilibrium through different channels:
(a) it rises the tightness in the labor market
(b) it reduces the transmission of labor productivity gains towards
wage
(c) it reduces the incentives to search for a job
(d) it increases the cost payed by a firm when it posts a vacancy job.
2. As a result, a tighter environmental tax increases the steady-state unemployment rate, whatever the source of pollution.
3. With respect to the perfect labor market economy, taking into account
frictions on labor market and wage bargain:
(a) reduces the steady-state level of output, for a given environmental
tax;
(b) reinforces the negative impact of a tighter environmental tax on
final output.
4. Besides the “conventional effects of the environmental tax (the ” direct “pollution reduction” effect, positive for health, and the indirect
“crowding-out” effect, negative for health), taking into account frictions
on labor market and wage bargain introduces two “new” (detrimental)
channels:
(a) through the incentives to search for a job,
(b) through the cost of a vacant job.
These two effects lead to a reduction in health expenditures, ceteris
paribus and therefore, with respect to the perfect labor market economy,
(a) they reduce the steady-state health status, for a given environmental tax,
(b) they reduce the positive impact of the environmental taxation on
health.
5. Rising abatement expenditures as a way of tightening environmental
protection would be better for health, because it does not introduce
additional negative impacts arising from the labor market.
4

All these results mean that current articles studying the influence of environmental policy and health assuming perfect labor market overestimate the
positive impact of environmental policy on health. They call for a quantitative investigation of the amplitude of the different effects highlighted in the
literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we present the model.
In section three, we describe the steady-state and we study the impact of
environmental policy on unemployment and health. In section four, we investigate the impact of abatement expenditures on health. In section five,
we conclude.
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The basic framework

Let us consider the framework developed by Shi and Wen (1999) in which
we introduce pollution and endogenous health.

2.1

Households

The economy is populated by many identical households whose size is normalized to one. Population size is also normalized to unity. Each household
is made of a size one continuum of infinitely-lived agents who are endowed
with one unit of time. At any moment an agent has the choice between work,
job-search or leisure. Each agent who is searching for a job is considered as
unemployed. He is randomly matched with job vacancies. Following Shi and
Wen (1999), to solve the aggregation problem linked to the idiosyncratic risks
faced by each unemployed agent in the job-matching process, we assume that
all agents of a given household care only about the household’s utility.6 As
a result, solving the representative household’s maximization problem gives
the agents’ decisions.
The expected lifetime utility of the representative household is given by:
Λ(t) ≡

Z

t

∞

e−ρ(z−t) u (C(z), l(z), h(z)) dz

where h denotes health-status, C is consumption and l is the time used for
leisure activities defined as:7
l = 1 − U − Ls
where U is the time used for search (unemployment), Ls is the time for work
supplied by the household.
6
7

See Shi and Wen (1999, p 460) for more details.
Time index is dropped when there is no confusion
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At each moment of time, some members of the household who are unemployed find a job, and another who are employed lose it (because a idiosyncratic choc destroys a constant part of existing work contracts on market
labor).
Let denote by m, the rate at which unemployed agent finds a job and so
mU is the flow of job matches for a household with U unemployed members.
Even if m depends on the aggregate numbers of job vacancies and unemployed
agents (see below), individuals take m as given. Let denote by σ > 0 the
exogenous constant rate of job destruction. Then, the employment evolves
according to:
dL
= mU − σLs
dz
Following Aisa and Pueyo (2004) and Pautrel (2012) among others, we
assume that individual’s health status evolves over time according to two
opposite forces. The first one, positive, relies on health investment made
by people in health-enhancing activities, modeled as health expenditures,
denoted H.8 The second one, negative, is mainly due to the detrimental
impact of pollution on health. Therefore, the temporal evolution of the
health status can be written as:
dh
ḣ ≡
= ηH ψ − δh (P )h
(1)
dz
where ψ ∈]0, 1[ captures the decreasing returns in medical activities, P is the
stock of pollution and δh′ (P ) > 0.
L̇s ≡

Budget constraint of the households is given by:
dKs
= (1 − τk )rKs + Π + (1 − τw )w̃Ls − C − H + τu w̃U + S (2)
dz
where w̃ is the wage expressed in efficiency terms, (1 − τk )r is the after-tax
interest rate and τu is the rate of subsidy to unemployment. Π is the profit
of the firm and τw is labor income tax. S is a lump-sum transfer from the
government. Here, pollution arises from physical capital therefore τk is also
the environmental tax.
A representative household chooses (C, Ls , U, H) and the supply of capital
Ks to solve
K̇s ≡

max

Z

C,Ls ,U,H,Ks t

∞

e−ρ(z−t) u (C, 1 − U − Ls , h) dz

s.t.
K̇s = (1 − τk )rKs + Π + (1 − τw )w̃Ls − C − H + τu w̃U + S
L̇s = mU − σLs
ḣ = ηH ψ − δh (P )h
Ks (0) = Ks0 , Ls (0) = Ls0 , h(0) = h0 given
8

In the appendix, we develop a general version of this model with time-consuming
activities aimed at enhancing health. The qualitative results are not modified but algebraic
expressions are more complicated.
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First-order conditions give
Ċ =

u1
[ρ − (1 − τk )r]
u11

(foc1)

and
u2 = mλL + τu w̃u1 ,

(foc2)

that is, the opportunity cost of search (the left-hand side) is equal to the
marginal benefit of search (the right-hand side). Furthermore,
λL =

(1 − τw )w̃u1 − u2 + λ̇L
,
ρ+σ

(foc3)

that is, the capital value of the employment to the household (the left-hand
side) is equal the present value of the clash flow generated by the employment
(1 − τw )w̃u1 − u2 plus capital gains λ̇L , discounted by ρ + σ. Finally

2.2

λh = u1 H 1−ψ / [ηψ]

(foc4)

λ̇h = −u3 + [ρ + δh (P )] λh

(foc5)

The firms

Final output Y is produced by firms operating under perfect competition,
with a constant-returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = F (Kd , hLd ) ≡ Z (Kd )α (hLd )1−α

(3)

where Kd is the demand for physical capital, Ld is demand for labour. Z >
0 is a productivity parameter. h captures worker productivity, which is
assumed to depend on health exclusively.9 Because of frictions on market
labor, the firm faces a linear cost of adjustment of the stock of labor, such
that:
L˙d = qV − σLd
where q is the instantaneous probability to fill the vacant job.
An individual firm chooses the number of vacancy V , the demand for
capital Kd and employment Ld in order to solve:
max

Kd ,Ld ,V

Z

t

∞

Πe(1−τk )r(t−z) dz

s.t.
Π = Y − w̃Ld − (r + δ)Kd − (1 − τv )ξ˜V V
L̇d = qV − σLd
Y = F (Kd , hLd , )
Kd (0) = Kd0 , Ld (0) = Ld0 given
9

See Mathieu-Bolh and Pautrel (2016) for a justification.
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where ξ˜V is the flow cost per vacancy in efficiency terms (that is h · ξV ),
0 < δ < 1 is the physical capital depreciation rate and τv is the per unit
subvention to job posting. First-order conditions give
FK = r + δ,

(foc6)

µL q = (1 − τv )ξ˜V ,

(foc7)

and

that is, the effective marginal cost of vacancy ξ˜V equals the marginal benefit
of vacancy to the firm µL q. Furthermore,
µL =

FL − w̃ + µ̇L
,
(1 − τk )r + σ

(foc8)

that is, the capital value of vacancy to the firm (the left-hand side) is equal
the present value of the clash flow linked to vacancy (1 − τy )FL − w̃ plus
capital gains µ̇L , discounted by (1 − τk )r + σ.

2.3

Matching and wage determination

On labor market, here is a matching process through which vacant jobs
and employed individuals are randomly matched with each other (Pissarides,
1990). Nevertheless, the aggregate flow of job matches are deterministic and
given by a matching function denoted by M(U, V ) where U and V represent
respectively the unemployed agents and aggregate job vacancies. We assume,
as conventional, that the function M(·, ·) is a linearly homogenous function
such that
M(U, V ) = M0 V j U 1−j ,

j ∈ (0, 1), M0 > 0

where j is called the elasticity of vacancy in job matches. We denote θ ≡ V /U
as the tightness of labor market; a smaller θ represents a tighter market.
Defining the matches per employed by m and the matches per vacancy by q,
with the constant-returns-to-scale technology of the matching function, both
matches depend only on θ:
m = m(θ) = M0 θj

q = q(θ) = m(θ)/θ

Once an unemployed agent is matched with a vacant post, the agent and
the firm decide the agent’s current and future wages. As usual, the wage is
defined through a negotiation aimed at maximizing the weighted Nash product of the agent’s and the firm’s surpluses. An additional member working dL
at the wage w̃ increases the household’s utility by [(1 − τw )w̃u1 − u2 ] dL. An
additional worker dL at the wage w̃ increases the firm’s current-valued surplus by [FL − w̃] dL.10 As a result, the negotiation consists in the following
10

Note that

u2
can be interpreted like the agent’s reservation wage.
(1 − τw )u1
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program:
max [FL − w̃]1−φ [(1 − τw )u1 w̃ − u2 ]φ
w̃

where φ ∈ (0, 1) is the worker’s bargaining power. Solving the Nash problem
yields:11
w̃ = φFL + (1 − φ)

2.4

u2
(1 − τw )u1

(4)

Government and ecology

Ecology is captured by the stock of pollution P which rises with the flow of
pollution emission E and is reduced by abatement activities denoted by A,
such that the law of motion of the stock of pollution is
Ṗ = Ω (E, A) − γP ,
where γ > 0 is the nature regeneration rate, and Ω (E, A) is the net flow
of pollution (with Ω1 > 0 and Ω2 < 0). For simplicity we assume that
Ω(E, A) ≡ E − A.12
Here, we suppose that physical capital is the source of pollution.13 Then
the flow of polluting emissions is defined as E = πk K where πk ≥ 0 is the
polluting capacity of physical capital stock.
The government budget is balanced at all times. A part β ∈ [0, 1] of the
environmental tax revenues is used to fund abatement activities (which used
forgone output), denoted by A:
βτk rK = A

(5)

and therefore
Ṗ = (πk − βτk r) K − γP

(6)

The remaining of the environmental tax revenue is used with the labor
tax revenue to fund unemployment benefits, vacancy subsidies and lump-sum
transfers:
(1 − β)τk rK + τw w̃L = τu w̃U + S + τv ξ˜V V

(7)

u2
.
(1 − τw )u1
12
Assuming that Ω(E, A) ≡ E/A would not modify the qualitative results of the model.
Proof upon request.
13
In the appendix A page 18, we develop a general version of this model in which
we take into account both physical capital and final output as sources of pollution. We
demonstrate in appendix A.2 page 23 that results are not qualitatively modified when
output is assumed to be the source of pollution instead of physical capital.
11

In a standard neoclassical model, w̃ = FL =

9
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Environmental policy, unemployment and
health

In this section we investigate how the imperfections on labor market modify
the impact of the environmental policy on both the economic activity and
health, at the steady-state equilibrium. The steady-state equilibrium is such
that C, H, U, L, V , K, Y are constant.
We assume that utility function is additively separable between consumption and leisure (following Andolfatto, 1996; Merz, 1995; Shi and Wen, 1997,
1999) and we model felicity function between consumption and health as a
Cobb-Douglas (following Van Zon and Muysken, 2001):14


u (C, 1 − U − L, h) ≡ log C

1−µh µh

h



(U + L)1+ϕ
−χ
,
1+ϕ

0 < σh < 1

with χ > 0, µh ∈]0, 1[ the weight of consumption in utility, 1/σh is the
intertempral elasticity of substitution. Parameter ϕ > 0 captures Frisch
elasticity of labor supply.
At the steady-state, Ṗ = 0, therefore from (6):
P⋆ =

1
(πk − βτk r ⋆ ) K ⋆
γ

(8)

Because at the steady-state equilibrium, λ̇h = 0, from equations (foc4)
and (foc5), we can express the expenditures in health care as a proportion
E(P ⋆ ) ∈]0, 1[ of the steady-state consumption level C ⋆ :
⋆

⋆

H = E(P ) C

⋆

ψδh (P ⋆)
with E(P ) ≡
ρ + δh (P ⋆ )
⋆

µh
1 − µh

!

(9)

where δh′ (P ⋆ ) > 0 and dE(P ⋆)/dP ⋆ > 0.
Because at the steady-state equilibrium, Ċ = 0, it comes from (foc1),
(1−τk )r = ρ, and therefore equation (foc6) gives physical capital per efficient
unit of labor, k ≡ K/(hL), as a function of the environmental tax:
k ⋆ = b(τk )

where




b(τk ) ≡ 


1/(1−α)


Zα


ρ
+δ
1 − τk

(10)

Because at the steady-state equilibrium, λ˙L = 0, we obtain from (foc2) and
(foc3):
u⋆2 (ρ + σ + m(θ⋆ )) = u⋆1 w̃ ⋆ [m(θ⋆ )(1 − τw ) + (σ + ρ)τu ]
14

(11)

Conversely to Van Zon and Muysken (2001) who used the general form
1−1/σh
C 1−µh hµh
−1
where 0 < σh < 1 and 1/σh is the intertemporal elasticity of
1 − 1/σh
substitution, we choose here the logarithmic form (σh = 1) for tractability.
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Putting this expression in (4) gives the wage rate expressed in efficient units:
w̃ ⋆ = Φ(θ⋆ )FL⋆

where Φ(θ⋆ ) ≡

φ(ρ + σ + m(θ⋆ ))(1 − τw )
<1
(ρ + σ + m(θ⋆ )φ)(1 − τw ) − (1 − φ)(σ + ρ)τu
(12)

and Φ′ (θ⋆ ) > 0. Φ(θ⋆ ) captures the first impact of unemployment on our
economy, through the wage bargaining process. Because φ < 1, Φ(θ⋆ ) is
increasing in matching probability. The lower matching probability is, the
smaller is bargained wage with respect to labor productivity. As a result,
a tighter labor market reduces the transmission of an increase in labor productivity to wage. And this phenomenon is stronger for low level of worker’s
bargaining power (φ).
Because µ˙L = 0, from (foc7), (foc8) and (12), the tightness of labor market
at the steady-state θ⋆ is given by the following equation
(1 − α)Zb(τk )α =

θ⋆ (ρ + σ) (1 − τv )ξV
m(θ⋆ ) [1 − Φ(θ⋆ )]

(13)

Proposition 1. In the presence of frictions on labor market and wage bargaining, a tighter environmental tax increases the tightness in labor market
at steady-state:
θ⋆ = Θ(τk )

with

Θ ′ (τk ) < 0

Proof. From equation (13).
The influence of the environmental tax on labor market tightness can be
explained as follows. When the environmental tax increases, ceteris paribus,
the marginal benefit of vacancy diminishes due the crowding out effect of
the tax which reduces labor reward. Because the marginal cost of vacancy
ξV remains constant, the firm posts less vacant jobs. As a result, θ = V /U
diminishes.
Corollary 1. In the presence of frictions on labor market and wage bargaining, a tighter environmental tax reduces the transmission of labor productivity gains to wage: Φ(θ⋆ ) with dΦ(θ⋆ )/dτk < 0.
Proof. From equation (12).
Because L̇ = 0, using the definition of m(θ), it comes
U⋆ =

σ
L⋆
⋆
m(θ )

(14)

Corollary 2. Taking into account frictions on labor market and wage bargaining, a tighter environmental tax rises the steady-state unemployment
rate (U ⋆ + L⋆ ) /L⋆ .
11

Proof. Straightforward from equation (14) and Proposition 1.
Replacing by the expressions of u1 and u2 in equation (11) and using (12)
and (14), we can re-express the equality between the opportunity cost of
search and the marginal benefit of search, obtaining a relationship between
C ⋆ and L⋆ :
C ⋆ = (1 − α)Zb(τk )α

!

1 − µh
Λ1 (θ⋆ ) L⋆ −ϕ h⋆
χ

(1 − τw )m(θ⋆ ) + (σ + ρ)τu
where Λ1 (θ ) ≡ Φ(θ )
σ + ρ + m(θ⋆ )
⋆

⋆

σ
+1
m(θ⋆ )

!−ϕ

(15)
with 0 < Λ1 (θ⋆ ) < 1 because 0 < τu < 1 and dΛ1 (θ⋆ ) /dτk < 0.
Corollary 3. Taking into account frictions on labor market and wage bargaining, a tighter environmental tax reduces the incentives to search for a
job. This effect is captured through the term Λ1 (θ⋆ ): a rise in Λ1 (θ⋆ ) means
a higher incentives to search for a job.
Proof. Straightforward from the expression of Λ1 (θ⋆ ) in equation (15) and
Proposition 1.
Λ1 (θ⋆ ) captures three elements introduced by the existence of unemployment which directly impact the incentive to search. First, because of wage
bargaining, wage rate is partially delinked from labor productivity, proportionally through the coefficient Φ(θ⋆ ). A rising environmental tax increases
this disconnection between wage and labor productivity, and therefore reduces incentives to search for a job. Second, everything the same, to obtain
a job, it is required to match with a vacancy job (with a given probability
m) and when you get a job you have a probability σ to lose it. Therefore, a rising environmental tax diminishes the probability of matching and,
as consequence, the incentives to search. This is captured by the term
(1 − τw )m(θ ⋆ ) + (σ + ρ)τu
. Third, unemployment reduces non-leisure time forcing
σ + ρ + m(θ ⋆ )
unemployed to search for a new job. As a result, the householdlabor force
−ϕ
supply is reduced by this amount. This is captured by the term m(θσ ⋆ ) + 1 .
Because K̇ = 0, using (5), (14) and (2), we can define a second relationship between C ⋆ and L⋆ :
C⋆ =

h





i

τk
Z − δ + β 1−τ
ρ b(τk )1−α b(τk )α − Λ2 (θ⋆ )
k

1 + E(P ⋆)

where Λ2 (θ⋆ ) ≡
with Λ2 (θ⋆ ) > 0 and dΛ2 (θ⋆ ) /dτk < 0.
12

h⋆ L⋆

σθ⋆
(1 − τv )ξV
m(θ⋆ )

(16)

Corollary 4. Taking into account frictions on labor market and wage bargaining, a tighter environmental tax increases the “economy’s cost of vacancy”. This effect is captured through the term Λ2 (θ⋆ ): a decrease in Λ2 (θ⋆ )
means a higher “economy’s cost of vacancy”.
Proof. Straightforward from the expression of Λ2 (θ⋆ ) in equation (16) and
Proposition 1.
Equation (16) is derived from the equality between household’s incomes
and household’s expenditures. Because the household earns firms, they get
their profits which are negatively influenced by the cost of posting vacant
jobs, itself negatively impacted by the probability of matching. This effect,
representing the “economy’s cost of vacancy” is captured by Λ2 (θ⋆ ). Everything being equal, it reduces the amount consumed by the household,
with respect to the case of a perfect market labor. Rising environmental
tax diminishes Λ2 (θ⋆ ) and therefore increases the economy’s cost of vacancy
because the probability of filling the vacant post reduces.
Finally, using (15), (16) and previous results, we obtain15 the steady-state
amount of labor employed in production :


L⋆ = L(P ⋆ , τk ) ≡ 

(1 + E(P ⋆ ))(1 − α)Z




ηE(P ⋆)ψ+ι
C⋆ =
δh (P ⋆ )
×

#

1−µh
χ



Λ1 (Θ(τk ))

τk
ρ b(τk )1−α −
Z − δ + β 1−τ
k

the steay-state level of consumption:
"



1
1+ϕ

(

−ϕ

[1 + E(P ⋆)]

Λ2 (Θ(τk ))
b(τk )α

(1 − α)Zb(τk )α

τk
Z − δ+β
ρ b(τk )1−α b(τk )α − Λ2 (θ⋆ )
1 − τk









1
 1+ϕ



,

(17)

!

1 − µh
Λ1 (Θ(τk ))
χ

ϕ 

1
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

(18)

the health-status of each individual:
⋆

h

=

1
1−ψ

ηE(P ⋆)ψ
δh (P ⋆)

!





⋆

× Λ1 (θ )

−ψϕ

(1 + E(P ⋆ )) (1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

(19)

τk
Z − δ+β
ρ b(τk )1−α b(τk )α − Λ2 (Θ(τk ))
1 − τk






ϕ 

ψ
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

,

and the expression of final output:
"

⋆

α ηE(P

⋆ ψ

)
Y = Y(P , τk ) ≡ Z b(τk )
δh (P ⋆ )
⋆



15

×

#

1
1−ψ

!

#

⋆



(1 + E(P ))


Z− δ+

Demonstration in appendix A page 21.
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1
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

1 − µh
Λ1 (Θ(τk ))
(1 − α)Z
χ

"



τk
β 1−τ
ρ
k

b(τk )1−α −

Λ2 (Θ(τk ))
b(τk )α



(20)
1−ψ(1+ϕ)
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

where Θ ′(τk ) < 0, Λ1 (Θ(τk )) and Λ2 (Θ(τk )) are respectively defined in equation (15) and (16). Finally, using (8) and (20), the steady-state stock of
pollution is given by the following implicit function:


P ⋆ = πk − β

τk ρ
b(τk )1−α Y(P ⋆ , τk )/Z
1 − τk


(21)

Proposition 2. The net flow of pollution at steady-state is defined as:
P ⋆ = P(τk )

with

P ′ (τk ) < 0

(22)

Proof. See appendix B page 25.
Furthermore, it comes
Proposition 3. With respect to the perfect labor market economy, taking
into account frictions on labor market and wage bargain:
1. reduces the steady-state level of output, for a given environmental tax;
2. reinforces the negative impact of a tighter environmental tax on final
output.
Proof. The influence of imperfections on labor market is captured by Λ1 (Θ(τk ))
and Λ2 (Θ(τk )) in equation (20). 0 < Λ1 (Θ(τk )) < 1 from equation (15) and
Λ2 (Θ(τk )) > 0 from equation (16), and from appendix B page 25, we know
that P ⋆ increases in Λ1 (Θ(τk )) and Λ2 (Θ(τk )). Then comparing Y ⋆ with the
steady-state level of output in the presence of free labor market Y f ⋆ (given by
equation C.22 in appendix C page 28), it is straightforward that Y ⋆ < Y f ⋆ .
Furthermore, from Corollaries 3 and 4, Λ1 (Θ(τk )) and Λ2 (Θ(τk )) both
decrease in τk , adding two further negative impacts of the environmental tax
on steady-state output.
According to Proposition 3, taking into account frictions on labor market
and wage bargaining tends to rise the negative impact of the environmental
tax on both labor supply, consumption and final output (see respectively
equations 17, 18 and 20). As a consequence, a tighter environmental tax will
not only worsen unemployment in the economy, it will hurt more strongly all
the economy through the impact of the tightening of the labor market.
In the same way, not taking into account imperfections on labor market
leads to overestimate the positive impact of the environmental tax on health
status, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.
1. Taking into account frictions on labor market and wage bargain introduces two “new” (detrimental) channels:
(a) the “incentives to search for a job” effect (captured by Λ1 (Θ(τk ))).
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(b) the “vacancy cost” effect (captured by Λ2 (Θ(τk ))).
2. With respect to the perfect labor market economy, these two new channels:
(a) reduce the steady-state health status, for a given environmental
tax,
(b) reduce the positive impact of the environmental taxation on health.
Proof. Straightforward from equation (19) and corollaries 3 and 4.
There are four channels through which environmental tax impacts healthstatus. First, by reducing pollution, the environmental tax reduces its detrimental on health, and ceteris paribus the individual health status rises.
This effect, called the “pollution reduction” effect is captured by the term
1

 1−ψ
 −ψϕ
ηE(P ⋆ )ψ
⋆
1 + E(P ) (1−ψ)(1+ϕ)
in equation (19). Second, the environmental
δh (P ⋆ )
tax has a crowding out effect on production which leads to a decrease in output and income. As a result, ceteris paribus health expenditures reduce and
therefore health status diminishes. This negativeh impact
on health,
called


i
τk
1−α
α
the “crowding out” effect is captured by the term Z − δ + β 1 − τ ρ b(τk )
b(τk )
k
in equation (19). Third, the increase in environmental tax rises the tightness
on market labor and the unemployment rate. As noted in Corollary 3 page
12, this directly reduces incentives for agent to search for a job because labor
productivity improvements translated less in an increase in income (through
Φ(θ⋆ )), the probability to match m(θ⋆ ) is lowered and the increase in unemployment reduces leisure-time. This negative effect on health, called the
“incentives to search for a job” effect is captured by the term Λ1 (Θ(τk )) in
equation (19). Fourth, as noted in Corollary 4, a tighter environmental tax
by reducing the probability of matching rises the cost of vacancy and as the
result the profits of the firms owned by agents. As a result, the amount of
resources agents are able to use in order to improve health is reduced. This
negative effect on health, called the “vacancy cost” effect is captured by the
term Λ2 (Θ(τk )) in equation (19). The two first channels are “conventional”
channels already highlighted in the literature, while the two last channels are
new and related to the introduction of labor market imperfections.
Propositions 3 and 4 do not mean that the two new channels of transmission of the environmental tax introduced by imperfections on labor market
leads to a global negative impact of environmental regulation on output and
health. Further investigations are required to evaluate if these two negative
effects offset the health dividend found in the presence of prefect market
labor.16
16

This is the subject to a current work in progress.
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4

Abatement expenditures as an alternative
environmental policy

Many empirical studies, especially on environment and labor uses abatement
expenditures as a proxy for the environmental policy strength. Because in
our model, we allow the revenue of the environmental tax to not be fully
used for funding abatement (through parameter β in equation (5) page 9), a
way to capture the role played by abatement expenditures as environmental
policy is to investigate how β affects the economy and the labor market.
We derive the following proposition from previous exposition of the model:
Proposition 5.
1. The part of environmental tax revenue funding abatement (β) does not
affect the tightness on labor market and the unemployment rate.
2. A greater part of environmental tax revenue dedicated to abatement (a
higher β) reduces the steady-state stock of pollution, rises the steadystate health-status and has an incertain impact on the steady-state
level of output.
Proof. From equations (19), (20) and (22).
It comes the interesting following insight:
Corollary 5. Increasing the part of environmental tax revenue funding abatement (β) as a way of tightening environmental protection would be better
for health than rising the environmental tax, because it does not introduce
additional negative impacts arising from the labor market.
Proof. Directly from Proposition 5.1.

5

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to re-examine the health effect of the environmental policy in the presence of labor market imperfections. For that purpose
we developed an intertemporal general equilibrium model with pollution, endogenous health-status and imperfections on labor market.
The contribution of the article is manyfold. Especially, it shows that a
higher environmental tax increases the labor market tightness and therefore
the unemployment rate in the long run. It also demonstrates that market
labor imperfections introduce new channels of transmission of environmental
policy on health which reduce the expected positive effect of less pollution on
health. Our model is coherent with the empirical evidence according to, at
firm-level, layoffs (captured here by a rise in unemployment) are detrimental
for health. Finally, it demonstrates that increasing abatement expenditures
16

as a way of tightening the environmental policy would be better for health
than increasing environmental tax in the presence of market labor imperfections.
Further investigations are required, especially to evaluate quantitatively
the two negative effects of environmental tax on health arising from labor
market imperfections and the global effect of the environmental tax on health.
Furthermore, our modeling could be enriched by introducing an explicit
abatement sector (like in Hafstead and Williams III, 2016) to investigate
how our results are modified.
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APPENDIX
A

Model resolution

Here, we solve the model taking into account both τy and τk in the same
framework.
The representative household chooses (C, Ls , U, H) and the supply of capital Ks to solve
max

Z

∞

C,Ls ,U,H,Ks t

e−ρ(z−t) u (C, 1 − T − U − Ls , h) dz

s.t.
K̇s = (1 − τk )rKs + Π + (1 − τw )w̃Ls − C − H + τu w̃U + S
L̇s = mU − σLs
ḣ = G(H, T ) − δh (P )h
Ks (0) = Ks0 , Ls (0) = Ls0 , h(0) = h0 given
The current Hamiltonian is:
Hho = u (C, 1 − T − U − Ls , h)
+ λK [(1 − τk )rKs + (1 − τw )w̃Ls − C − H + τu w̃U + S]
+ λL [mU − σLs ] + λh [G(H, T ) − δh (P )h]
with transversality conditions such that:
lim λK Ks eρ(t−z) = lim λL Ls eρ(t−z) = lim λh heρ(t−z) = 0

z→∞

z→∞

z→∞

First-order conditions are:17
∂Hho
=0
∂C
∂Hho
=0
∂U
∂Hho
=0
∂H
∂Hho
=0
∂T
λ̇K − ρλK = −
λ̇L − ρλL = −
17

Recall that

:

u 1 − λK = 0

(A.1)

:

τu w̃λK − u2 + mλL = 0

(A.2)

:

−λK + G1 (H, T )λh = 0

(A.3)

:

−u2 + G2 (H, T )λh = 0

(A.4)

∂Hho
= −(1 − τk )rλK
∂Ks

∂Hho
= u2 − (1 − τw )w̃λK + σλL
∂Ls

∂u (C, l, h) ∂l
∂u (C, l, h)
=
= u2 × (−1), with i = {Ls , H}.
∂i
∂l
∂i
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(A.5)
(A.6)

∂Hho
= −u3 + δh (P )λh
∂h
Rewriting first-order conditions, we get
λ̇h − ρλh = −

(A.7)

u1
[ρ − (1 − τk )r]
u11

Ċ =

(A.8)

mλL = u2 − τu w̃u1

(A.9)

The marginal benefit of the employment to the household (the right-hand
side) is equal to the opportunity cost of the employment (the left-hand side).
λL =

(1 − τw )w̃u1 − u2 + λ̇L
ρ+σ

(A.10)

The capital value of the employment to the household (the left-hand side)
is equal the present value of the clash flow generated by the employment
(1 − τw )w̃u1 − u2 plus capital gains λ̇L , discounted by ρ + σ.
Finally,
λh = u1 /G1 (H, T )

and

λh = u2 /G2 (H, T )

(A.11)

that is
G1 (H, T )
u1
=
G2 (H, T )
u2

(A.12)

λ̇h = −u3 + [ρ + δh (P )] λh

(A.13)

Program of the firm is:
max

Kd ,E,V

Z

t

∞

h

(1 − τy )Y − (1 − τv )ξ˜V V − w̃Ld − (r + δ)Kd e(1−τk )r(t−z) dz
i

s.t.
L˙d = qV − σLd
Y = F (Kd , hLd , )
Kd (0) = Kd0 , Ld (0) = Ld0 given
The current Hamiltonian is written as:

Hf = (1−τy )F (Kd , hLd )−(1−τv )ξ˜V V −w̃Ld −(r+δ)Kd +µL [qV −σLd ]
The first-order conditions are
∂Hf
=0
∂V

:

(1 − τv )ξ˜V = µLq

(A.14)

∂Hf
=0
∂Kd

:

(1 − τy )FK = r + δ

(A.15)
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∂Hf
= − [(1 − τy )FL − w̃] + σµL
∂Ld
and transversality condition is
µ̇L − (1 − τk )rµL = −

(A.16)

lim µLLd e(1−τk )r(t−z) = 0

z→∞

Rewriting first-order conditions, we get
(1 − τy )FK = r + δ

(A.17)

µL q = (1 − τv )ξ˜V

(A.18)

The effective marginal cost of vacancy ξ˜V equals the marginal benefit of
vacancy to the firm µL q.
µL =

(1 − τy )FL − w̃ + µ̇L
(1 − τk )r + σ

(A.19)

The capital value of vacancy to the firm (the left-hand side) is equal the
present value of the clash flow linked to vacancy (1 − τy )FL − w̃ plus capital
gains µ̇L , discounted by (1 − τk )r + σ.
The government budget is balanced at all times. A part β ∈]0, 1[ of the
environmental tax revenues is used to fund abatement activities (which used
forgone output), denoted by A: β (τy Y + τk rK) = A. The remaining of
the environmental tax revenue is used with the labor tax revenue to fund
unemployment benefits, vacancy subsidies and lump-sum transfers:
(1 − β) (τy Y + τk rK) + τw w̃L = τu w̃U + S + τv ξ˜V V

A.1

(A.20)

Steady-state equilibrium

In the steady-state equilibrium, we have L̇(t) = U̇ (t) = 0 and µ˙L (t) =
µ˙K (t) = λ˙K (t) = λ˙L (t) = λ˙h (t) = 0. From (A.1), C, H, T , U, L, V , K, Y
are constant.
Utility function is:


u (C, 1 − U − L, h) ≡ log C

1−µh µh

h



(T + U + L)1+ϕ
−χ
1+ϕ

Therefore, we have:
u1 = (1 − µh ) C −1
u2 = −χ (T + U + L)ϕ
u3 = µh h−1
Because we assumed that Ω(E, A) ≡ E−A, it comes Ω(E, A) = (πy − βτy ) Y +
(πk − βτk r) K. At the steady-state, Ṗ = 0 implies from (6):
P⋆ =

1
[(πy − βτy ) Y ⋆ + (πk − βτk r ⋆ ) K ⋆ ]
γ
20

(A.21)

Furthermore, we can define

η [ψH σG

+ ιT σG ]1/σG ,
G(H, T ) ≡
ηH ψ T ι ,
σG = 0

σG ∈] − ∞, 0[∪]0, 1]

therefore

G1 (H, T ) = ηψH σG −1 [ψH σG + ιT σG ]1/σG −1
G2 (H, T ) = ηιT σG −1 [ψH σG + ιT σG ]1/σG −1
Then from (A.12)

ψ
(1 − µh ) χ (T + U + L)ϕ
=
C
ι

"

ψC
H=
ι (1 − µh ) χ (T + U + L)ϕ

#1/(1−σG )



H
T

σG −1

that is

T

(A.22)

Because λ̇h = 0, from equations (A.11) and (A.13), we can express the
expenditures in health care as a proportion E(P ⋆) ∈]0, 1[ of the steady-state
consumption level C ⋆ which negatively depends on the environmental tax
and :
⋆

⋆

H = E(P )C

⋆

ψδh (P ⋆ )
with E(P ) ≡
ρ + δh (P ⋆ )
⋆

µh
1 − µh

!

(A.23)

To keep the model tractable, we assume in this version that health-care
expenditures et health-enhancing time are unitary substitutes, that is σG = 0.
As a consequence, equation (A.23) gives the implicit expression of T ⋆ :
E(P ⋆ )

ι (1 − µh ) ⋆
(T + U ⋆ + L⋆ )−ϕ = T ⋆
χψ

(A.24)

Because Ċ = 0, it comes from (A.8), (1 − τk )r = ρ and therefore equation
(A.15) enables us to express capital per efficient unit of labor (k ≡ K/(hL))
at the steady-state as a function of the environmental tax:
k ⋆ = b(τk )g(τy )


(A.25)
1/(1−α)

Zα 
where b(τk ) ≡  ρ
and g(τy ) = (1 − τy )1/(1−α) .
+δ
1−τk
Because λ˙L = 0, we obtain from (A.9) and (A.10):
u⋆2 (ρ + σ + m(θ⋆ )) = u⋆1 w̃ ⋆ [m(θ⋆ )(1 − τw ) + (σ + ρ)τu ]

(A.26)

Putting this expression in (4) gives:
w̃ ⋆ = Φ(θ⋆ )(1−τy )FL⋆

where Φ(θ⋆ ) ≡
21

φ(ρ + σ + m(θ⋆ ))(1 − τw )
<1
(ρ + σ + m(θ⋆ )φ)(1 − τw ) − (1 − φ)(σ + ρ)τu

(A.27)
and Φ′ (θ⋆ ) > 0.
Recalling that a variable x̃ expressed in efficiency units can by written as
h · x, and using (A.9), (A.27) and (A.25), we can express the wage rate as:
w ⋆ = Φ(θ⋆ )(1 − α)Zb(τk )α g(τy )

(A.28)

Because µ˙L = 0, from (A.18), (A.19) and (A.28):
(1 − α)Zb(τk )α g(τy ) =

θ⋆ (ρ + σ) (1 − τv )ξV
m(θ⋆ ) [1 − Φ(θ⋆ )]

(A.29)

This equality defines the tightness of labor market as a function of the environmental tax: θ⋆ = Θ(τy , τk ) with Θ ′(τi ) < 0 (i = y, k).
Because L̇ = 0, using the definition of m(θ), it comes
U⋆ =

σ
L⋆
m(θ⋆ )

(A.30)

Replacing by the expressions of u1 and u2 in equation (A.26) and using
(A.27) and (A.30), we obtain


σ
C ⋆ = A1 (θ⋆ , τy , τk )h⋆ 
+1
m(θ⋆ )

!−1

−ϕ

T ⋆ + L⋆ 

!

1 − µh
Λ1 (θ⋆ )
where A1 (θ , τy , τk ) ≡ (1 − α)Zb(τk ) g(τy )
χ
⋆

α

(1 − τw )m(θ⋆ ) + (σ + ρ)τu
and Λ1 (θ ) ≡ Φ(θ )
σ + ρ + m(θ⋆ )
⋆

⋆

!−ϕ

σ
+1
m(θ⋆ )
(A.31)

Because K̇ = 0, using (A.20), (A.30) and (2) enables us to define a second
relation between C ⋆ and L⋆ :
C ⋆ = A2 (θ⋆ , τy , τk , P ⋆)h⋆ L⋆
where A2 (θ⋆ , τy , τk , P ⋆) ≡

h

Z



1−βτy
1−τy







i

τk
− δ + β 1−τ
ρ b(τk )1−α b(τk )α g(τy ) − Λ2 (θ⋆ )
k

and Λ2 (θ⋆ ) ≡

1 + E(P ⋆ )
σθ⋆
(1 − τv )ξV
m(θ⋆ )

(A.32)

Therefore, (A.31) and (A.32), with (A.24), give:
L⋆ =
T⋆ =

A(θ⋆ , τy , τk , P ⋆)
ϕ

(A.33)

ϕ

(A.34)

[BE(P ⋆ ) + A(θ⋆ , τy , τk , P ⋆ )] 1+ϕ
BE(P ⋆ )
[BE(P ⋆ ) + A(θ⋆ , τy , τk , P ⋆ )] 1+ϕ
22

where

⋆
⋆

A(θ , τy , τk , P )



≡

A1 (θ ⋆ ,τy ,τk )
A2 (θ ⋆ ,τy ,τk ,P ⋆ )

(1−µh )ι
χψ

B≡

⋆

(1−α)Z(1+E(P
))(1−µ
 h )Λ1 (θ
 
= h  1−βτ
τ
y
χ Z

1−τy

⋆)
Λ (θ ⋆ )
α
k)

k ρ b(τ )1−α − 2
− δ+β 1−τ
k
b(τ
k

Because ḣ = 0 at the steady-state, equation (1) gives h⋆ = η
Then, from (A.32) and the fact that ξ˜V = hξV :


i

E(P ⋆)ψ C ⋆ ψ T ⋆ ι
.
δh (P ⋆)
1/(1−ψ)

ηE(P ⋆)ψ+ι
A1 (θ⋆ , τy , τk )Bι

C⋆ = 
δh (P ⋆ ) [BE(P ⋆ ) + A(θ⋆ , τ , τ , P ⋆ )] ϕ(1+ι)
1+ϕ

and then

y



k

1/(1−ψ)

A1 (θ⋆ , τy , τk )ψ Bι
ηE(P ⋆)ψ+ι

h⋆ = 
δh (P ⋆ ) [BE(P ⋆ ) + A(θ⋆ , τ , τ , P ⋆)] ϕ(ψ+ι)
1+ϕ
y

k

Finally, output per capita at steady-state is given by:
⋆

⋆

α

Y = Y(P , τy , τk ) ≡ Zb(τk ) g(τy )

α

"

ηE(P ⋆)ψ+ι Bι
δh (P ⋆)

#

1
1−ψ

ψ

×

A(θ⋆ , τy , τk , P ⋆)A1 (θ⋆ , τy , τk ) 1−ψ
ϕ(1+ι)

(A.35)

[BE(P ⋆ ) + A(θ⋆ , τy , τk , P ⋆)] (1+ϕ)(1−ψ)
And P ⋆ is defined by:
τk ρ
P − πy − βτy + πk − β
b(τk )1−α g(τy )1−α Y(P ⋆ , τy , τk ) = 0 (A.36)
1 − τk
⋆









Therefore, the system of equations (A.35) and (A.36) define Y ⋆ and P ⋆
as a function of τy and τk .

A.2

The special case where final output as a source of
pollution

In the case where output is the only source of pollution, the general model
is “modified” in the following ways. First, the tax on capital income, τk is
assumed to be null. Furthermore, we assume that final output is taxed at
τy ∈]0, 1[, which represents the environmental tax, now.
Therefore (10) becomes
k ⋆ = B1 g(τy )
"

Zα
where B1 ≡
ρ+δ

(10y)
#1/(1−α)

and g(τy ) = (1 − τy )1/(1−α) .
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Government is also modified because in this model the revenue of the
environmental tax is τy Y ⋆ . Therefore, budget equilibrium leads to A =
βτy Y ⋆ , and because emissions equal K ⋆ , equation (8) becomes
P ⋆ = [πy − βτy ] Y ⋆

(8y)

The remaining of the model is mostly
that the term

unchanged, except

τk
α
b(τk ) is replaced by B1 g(τy ), and Z − δ + β
ρ b(τk )1−α b(τk )α is
1 − τk
"
#
!
1 − βτy
replaced by Z
− δB11−α B1α g(τy ).
1 − τy
As a result, θ⋆ previously defined by equation (13) is defined by:
(1 −

θ⋆ (ρ + σ) (1 − τv )ξV
=
m(θ⋆ ) [1 − Φ(θ⋆ )]

α)ZB1α g(τy )

(13y)

Therefore, when the environmental tax is upon output rather than physical
capital, the environmental tax increases the tightness on labor market : θ⋆ =
Θ y (τy ) with Θ y′ (τy ) < 0. As a consequence, the unemployment rate increases
with a tightening of the environmental tax.
Furthermore, equation (9) remains the same, then it comes


(1 + E(P
 (1 − α)Z

h 

L⋆ = 

χ Z

1−βτy
1−τy

⋆



y

)) (1 − µh )Λ1 (Θ (τy )) 

− δB11−α −

Λ2 (Θ y (τy ))
B1α g(τy )

i

1
1+ϕ

(17y)



This additional influence comes from the fact that taxing physical capital
income reduces the wage interest rate ratio and therefore it incites agents to
supply more labor everything being equal.

ηE(P ⋆)ψ+ι
C =
δh (P ⋆ )
"

⋆

""

#

1 − βτy
Z
1 − τy

!

ηE(P ⋆)ψ+ι
h =
δh (P ⋆ )

#

×

1
1+ϕ

⋆

[1 + E(P )]
−

δB11−α

#

−ϕ
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

B1α g(τy )

(

(1 −
y

!

1 − µh
Λ1 (Θ y (τy ))
χ

α)ZB1α g(τy )
#ϕ )

1
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

(18y)

− Λ2 (Θ (τy ))

and
⋆

"

×

"

1
1+ϕ

1 − βτy
Z
1 − τy

⋆

[1 + E(P )]
!

−ϕψ
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

!

(

(1 −

α)ZB1α g(τy )

− δB11−α B1α g(τy ) − Λ2 (Θ y (τy ))

#ϕ )

!

1 − µh
Λ1 (Θ y (τy ))
χ

ψ
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

(19y)
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and
⋆

"

⋆

Y = Ỹ(P , τy ) ≡ Z g(τy )


×


with Θ y′ (τy ) < 0 and finally

α(1−ψ)+ψ ηE(P

⋆ ψ

)
⋆
δh (P )

#

1
1−ψ

"

!

1 − µh
(1 − α)Z
Λ1 (Θ y (τy ))
χ

⋆

(1 + E(P ))
Z



1−βτy
1−τy



−

δB11−α

−

Λ2 (Θ y (τy ))
B1α g(τy )



1−ψ(1+ϕ)
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)




P ⋆ = (πy − βτy ) Ỹ(P ⋆ , τy )

(20y)

(21y)

Following the same rationale than in appendix B page 25, it comes that the
net flow of pollution at steady-state is defined as:
P ⋆ = P̃(τy )

P ′ (τy ) < 0

with

(22y)

It is straightforward from equations (18y), (19y), (20y) and (22y) that
the influences of labor market imperfections on the economy are qualitatively
similar when the source of pollution is final output rather than physical
capital. We expect that the size of the negative effects could be greater
because in the case of pollution from final output, environmental tax is upon
physical capital and labor.

B

Proof of Proposition 2

Using (8) and (20), P ⋆ is the solution of
τk ρ
P − πk − β
b(τk )1−α Y(P ⋆, τk )/Z = 0
1 − τk
⋆





(21)

Because when 1 − (1 + ϕ)ψ > 0, Y(P ⋆ , τk ) is a decreasing function of P ⋆
and τk , the equation is increasing in P ⋆ and τk . Therefore, when the unique
solution P ⋆ exists, it is decreasing in τk , from the theorem of the implicit
functions.
When 1 − (1 + ϕ)ψ < 0, equation (21) can be written as (using 20):


P ⋆(1+ϕ)(1−ψ) 

(1 + E(P ⋆))




Λ2 (Θ(τk ))
b(τk )α
!1+ϕ
⋆ ψ

τk
ρ b(τk )1−α −
Z − δ + β 1−τ
k

1 − µh
−(1 − α)
χ

!

Zb(τk )α

ηE(P )
δh (P ⋆ )

(1+ϕ)ψ−1


Λ1 (Θ(τk )) = 0

Because the term into bracket on the first line is increasing in P ⋆ and decreasing in τk , the left-hand side of the equation remains increasing in P ⋆
and decreasing in τk , and therefore the same rational applies as in the case
1 − (1 + ϕ)ψ > 0.
25

#

1
(1−ψ)(1+ϕ)

C

Model with perfect labor market

Let us consider that labor market is perfect and there is full employment.
The representative household chooses (C, Ls ) and the supply of capital
Ks to solve
max

C,Ls ,Ks ,H

Z

∞

t

e−ρ(z−t) u (C, 1 − T − Ls , h) dz

s.t.
K̇s = (1 − τk )rKs + Π + (1 − τw )w̃Ls − C − H + S
ḣ = G(H, T ) − δh (P )h
Ks (0) = Ks0 , h(0) = h0 given
The current Hamiltonian is:
Hho = u (C, 1 − T − Ls , h)
+λK [(1 − τk )rKs + (1 − τw )w̃Ls − C − H + S]+λh [G(H, T ) − δh (P )h]
with transversality conditions such that:
lim λK Ks eρ(t−z) = lim λh heρ(t−z) = 0

z→∞

z→∞

First-order conditions are:18
∂Hho
=0
∂C

:

u 1 − λK = 0

(C.1)

∂Hho
=0
∂Ls

:

−u2 + (1 − τw )w̃λK = 0

(C.2)

:

−λK + G1 (H, T )λh = 0

(C.3)

:

−u2 + G2 (H, T )λh = 0

(C.4)

∂Hho
=0
∂H
∂Hho
=0
∂T
λ̇K − ρλK = −

∂Hho
= −(1 − τk )rλK
∂Ks

∂Hho
= −u3 + δh (P )λh
∂h
(C.3) and (C.4) give
λ̇h − ρλh = −

λh = u1 /G1 (H, T )

and

λh = u2 /G2 (H, T )

(C.5)
(C.6)

(C.7)

that is
G1 (H, T )
u1
=
G2 (H, T )
u2
18

Recall that

(C.8)

∂u (C, l, h) ∂l
∂u (C, l, h)
=
= u2 × (−1), with i = {Ls , H}.
∂i
∂l
∂i
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λ̇h = −u3 + [ρ + δh (P )] λh

(C.9)

Rewriting first-order conditions, we get
Ċ =

u1
[ρ − (1 − τk )r]
u11

(C.10)

u2 = (1 − τw )w̃u1

(C.11)

λh = u1 /G1 (H, T )

(C.7)

λ̇h = −u3 + [ρ + δh (P )] λh

(C.9)

An individual firm chooses the demand for capital Kd and employment
Ld to maximize its profit:
max Π = (1 − τy )Y − w̃Ld − (r + δ)Kd

Kd ,Ld

s.t.
Y = F (Kd , hLd )
Kd (0) = Kd0 given
The first-order conditions are
(1 − τy )FL = w̃

(C.12)

(1 − τy )FK = r + δ

(C.13)

At the steady-state, r = ρ, then the physical capital stock per efficient
labor at the steady-state equilibrium with perfect labor market, denoted k f ⋆ ,
is always equal to k ⋆ given by equation (10) and then from equation (C.12)
w f ⋆ = (1 − α)b(τk )α g(τy )

(C.14)

Equation (C.11) with the expressions of u1 and u2 gives


C f ⋆ = Ā1 (τy , τk )hf ⋆ T f ⋆ + Lf ⋆
where Ā1 (τy , τk ) ≡

−ϕ

!

1 − µh
(1 − τw )(1 − α)b(τk )α g(τy ) (C.15)
χ

which replaces (15).
Equation (A.23) remains unchanged except that now the steady-state
stock of pollution is denoted by P f ⋆ rather than P ⋆ , then equations (C.8)
and (C.7) with the expressions of u1 and u2 gives


E P f⋆



−ϕ
ι (1 − µh )  f ⋆
T + Lf ⋆
= T f⋆
χψ
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(C.16)

which replace (A.24). Using K̇ = 0 with public budget equilibium, it comes
C f ⋆ = Ā2 (τy , τk , P f ⋆ )hf ⋆ Lf ⋆
where Ā2 (τy , τk , P f ⋆) ≡

h



Z

1−βτy
1−τy





i



τk
− δ + β 1−τ
ρ b(τk )1−α b(τk )α g(τy )
k

1 + E (P f ⋆ )

(C.17)
which replaces (16). Therefore, from (C.15) and (C.17) with (C.16), let
equation (A.33) becoming
1

f⋆

L

=

Ā(τy , τk , P f ⋆ ) 1+ϕ
BE (P f ⋆ )
Ā(τy ,τk ,P f ⋆ )

+1

(C.18)

ϕ
1+ϕ





BE P f ⋆



T f⋆ = h
i ϕ
BE (P f ⋆ ) + Ā(τy , τk , P f ⋆) 1+ϕ

(C.19)

where




Ā(τy , τk , P f ⋆ )


B

≡

≡

Ā1 (τy ,τk )
Ā2 (τy ,τk ,P f ⋆ )

(1−µh )ι
χψ



Cf⋆ = 



(1−α)Z (1+E (P f ⋆ ))(1−µh )

= h  1−βτy  
τ
χ Z



η Ā1 (τy , τk )E P
δh

(P f ⋆ )

h

BE

(P f ⋆ )

k ρ b(τ )1−α
− δ+β 1−τ
k

1−τy

f⋆

k

ψ+ι

B

ι

, P f ⋆)

+ Ā(τy , τk

i

1/(1−ψ)

(C.20)

1/(1−ψ)

(C.21)



i ϕ(1+ι) 
1+ϕ

then


hf ⋆ = 



ψ



η Ā1(τy , τk ) E P
δh

(P f ⋆ )

h

BE

(P f ⋆ )

f⋆

ψ+ι

+ Ā(τy , τk

B

ι

, P f ⋆)



i ϕ(ψ+ι) 
1+ϕ

Finally


 ηE

Y f ⋆ = Ȳ(P f ⋆ , τy , τk ) ≡ Zb(τk )α g(τy )α 



P

f⋆

ψ+ι

δh (P f ⋆ )

1−ϕι

×

ι



B 

1
1−ψ



−ψ

Ā1 (τy , τk ) (1+ϕ)(1−ψ) Ā2 (τy , τk , P f ⋆ ) 1−ψ


BE (P f ⋆ )
Ā(τy ,τk ,P f ⋆ )
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+1



ϕ(1+ι)
(1+ϕ)(1−ψ)

(C.22)
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